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Citizenship Status and Patterns of Inequality in the United States and Canada
Sofya Aptekar

Objective: This study investigates inequalities in the distribution of citizenship status among
immigrants in Canada and the US between 1970 and 2001. It is motivated by a desire to probe
deeper into the gap in citizenship rates between the two countries.
Methods: Logistic regression analysis of Census data is used to predict the odds of citizenship
among the foreign-born, controlling for a range of factors.
Results: There has been a growing inequality in the distribution of citizenship in the US, but not
in Canada. Low rates of citizenship hide the appearance of a large disparity in citizenship
between those with the lowest levels of education and everyone else. These results cannot be
entirely ascribed to the presence of undocumented immigrants.
Conclusion: Persistent and large inequalities in citizenship leave the already disadvantaged
unskilled immigrants without access to rights, representation, security, and job and educational
opportunities.
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In Canada and the US, citizenship brings a range of rights and benefits, such as the ability
to vote and run for public office, access to some desirable jobs and educational benefits, travel
passports, and safeguards from deportation. High rates of citizenship among the foreign-born,
such as those found in Canada, signal success in immigrant incorporation. Low citizenship
uptake in the United States, on the other hand, raises questions about hurdles in the naturalization
process and boundaries erected around national membership. Moreover, inequality in the
distribution of the rights and benefits of citizenship along axes of stratification such as
socioeconomic status can compound social inequality and limit the political representation and
collective mobility of immigrant groups (Portes and Curtis, 1987). I demonstrate the growth of
citizenship inequality in the United States since the 1970s, with the least educated falling
precipitously behind. I show that a contemporaneous increase in naturalization in Canada was a
tide that lifted all boats: differences in citizenship by educational level are minor.
This article relies on analyses of Canadian and American census data from 1970 to 2001.
Comparisons with Canada in the study of American immigration are relatively rare, despite the
many parallels in immigration trends and policies, which allow for similar case analysis (Lipset,
1989; Zolberg, 1996). In the case of naturalization, this cross-country comparison is particularly
compelling due to the large and growing gap in citizenship rates. Until the 1980s, rates of
citizenship among the foreign-born in Canada and the US were similar, at around 60%. But
while the proportion of immigrants who are citizens in Canada has steadily increased to 75% in
2001, it has declined to 40% in the US in the same time period (Bloemraad, 2006b, see Figure 1).
I look at the relationships between a range of demographic and contextual factors and citizenship
status, evaluating various theoretical understandings of naturalization and exploring the
implications for larger processes of stratification. I begin with an overview of immigration and
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naturalization policies in the two countries and a description of the economic, contextual, and
assimilation models of citizenship acquisition. I then present the analytic results and attempt to
account for the trends over time and differences between Canada and the US.
[Figure 1 about here]

Immigration and Naturalization in Canada and the US
There are many similarities in the immigration history and policies of Canada and the US. They
are settler nations, populated by European migrants who pushed out the native population.
Citizenship for immigrants in both countries is based on the jus soli, or birthright citizenship
principle, and access to citizenship has been very similar since the post-World War II period
(Weil, 2001). The residency requirements in Canada are three years (five years prior to 1977),
and five years in the US. In both countries, there are lengthy waiting periods, with backlogs
varying by location, as well as examinations of language proficiency, civics, and history, and a
litany of forms and fees.
Canada and the US also share similar immigration policy trajectories. Ethnicity-based
restrictive policies implemented in the 1920s were lifted in both countries in the 1960s in favor
of more equitable policies, which eventually led to an influx of immigrants from developing
countries. Canada has long had a higher proportion of immigrants among its population: by
2001, 18% of the total population was foreign born compared to 13% in the US (Malone et al,
2003; Statistics Canada, 2003). The mix of national origins is also different: China and India
supply 36% of all immigrants to Canada, while immigrants from Mexico are 30% of the foreignborn in the US (Malone, et al 2003; Statistics Canada, 2005b). Finally, Canada admits many
more skill-based immigrants through its point system than the US, where most immigrants come
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through family reunification provisions. Nonetheless, on average, immigrants in the two
countries have similar levels of education (Bloemraad, 2006a). Although only Canada officially
recognizes dual citizenship, there is a de facto dual citizenship regime in the US because laws
governing renunciation of other allegiances are rarely enforced (Kivisto and Faist, 2007).
Moreover, dual citizenship laws in Canada and the US often clash with the laws of sending
countries, which may rescind citizenship from those gaining citizenship of another country or
make it impossible to give up original citizenship. Regardless, there is also evidence that many
immigrants do not claim dual citizenship, even when they technically have it (Bloemraad, 2004).
Despite the many similarities between naturalization processes and benefits of
naturalization in Canada and the US, the proportion of immigrants with citizenship in the US has
fallen far below that in Canada. The rate of acquiring citizenship has also decreased in the US
while increasing in Canada, and immigrants from every origin have lower proportion naturalized
in the US, even when disaggregated by cohort (Bloemraad, 2006a). Irene Bloemraad (2002,
2006a, 2006b) makes a strong case for the role of institutional factors as the explanation for the
citizenship gap between Canada and the US: the Canadian government programs actively
encourage and support citizenship acquisition, treating it as a right, whereas the US has a far less
interventionist approach that leaves citizenship up to the individual. Bloemraad’s conclusions
rest on cross-sectional analyses of 1990/1 census data for Portuguese and Vietnamese immigrant
groups, as well as extensive qualitative research. I build on her work – and that of others (e.g.
Bueker, 2005; Liang, 1994; Pantoja and Gershon, 2006; Yang, 1994) – by examining
naturalization patterns in the entire immigrant populations in Canada and the US over thirty
years, and by focusing on the potential of citizenship to exacerbate existing inequalities. As
such, this paper is of interest to scholars of inequality more generally.
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Citizenship and Inequality
Several theoretical perspectives are useful in explaining the mechanisms through which
citizenship comes to be unequally distributed and overlap with other social categories. Rational
choice economic maximization models presume autonomous actors who weigh the costs and
benefits of acquiring citizenship. Citizenship is attractive as a way of maximizing earnings
through access to jobs and federal contracts, academic scholarships, and travel passports. The
higher one’s education and income, the more one can expect to benefit from acquiring
citizenship. The positive relationship between socioeconomic status and citizenship among
immigrants has been amply documented in Canada and the US (e.g. Balistreri and Van Hook,
2004; Bloemraad, 2002; Bueker, 2005; DeVoretz and Pivenko, 2005; Jones-Correa, 2001; Liang,
1994; Mata, 1999; Pantoja and Gershon, 2006; Van Hook, Brown and Bean, 2006; Yang, 1994).
Aside from potentially higher earnings and better employment opportunities, naturalization gives
immigrants priority in sponsoring family migration to the US (but not to Canada). Given
financial requirements of sponsorship, immigrants with higher socioeconomic status may be
more interested in this benefit of citizenship. At the same time, immigrants with lower
socioeconomic status may be more likely to have relatives who want to move to the US
(Bloemraad, 2006a). Since 1996, federal welfare benefits in the US have been contingent upon
citizenship. Thus, immigrants with low levels of education may try to maximize their income
through naturalization, reducing class differences in the distribution of citizenship status (Borjas,
2002). In that case, the socioeconomic gradient of citizenship may, in fact, be steeper in Canada
because welfare benefits there are not contingent on citizenship. However, previous studies have
shown little evidence that welfare eligibility is related to naturalization in the US. Rather, the
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passage of the Welfare Reform Act – and contemporaneous measures that made deportation of
permanent residents much easier – served as a signal to all immigrants about the precariousness
of permanent resident status and the potential for further curtailment of rights (Balistreri and Van
Hook, 2004; Van Hook, Brown, and Bean, 2006).
The costs of naturalization range from the time and money invested in the application
process to potentially relinquishing the benefits of previous citizenships. Application fees and
citizenship tests are more costly for immigrants with lower levels of education. At the same
time, highly skilled immigrants are more likely to own property or have business interests in
other countries – benefits that they may lose when acquiring American or Canadian citizenship.
On the other hand, acquiring citizenship may aid the cosmopolitan lifestyle of the highly skilled
immigrants. The growing number of sending countries allowing dual citizenship in the 1990s
may be reflected in increasing naturalization rates among the highly-skilled between the 1990/1
and 2000/1 Census waves (Sejersen, 2008).
Another way of looking at naturalization is by considering contexts of exit and
reception. Immigrants from geographically distant countries, or countries with repressive
regimes, may be more likely to become citizens due to the difficulty in reversing their migration
(Bueker, 2005; Portes and Rumbaut, 1996). In contrast, immigrants who come to the US from
Mexico and Canada have lower citizenship rates than other groups partly due to the relative ease
with which they can reverse their immigrant status (Bloemraad, 2006a). The reversibility thesis
is undermined, however, by research indicating that citizenship acquisition can actually be a
means to increased transnational activity by easing travel to and contacts with the home country
(Gilbertson and Singer, 2003).
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Contexts of reception are different in Canada and the US. Although Canada has fewer
affirmative action-type measures than the US, government assistance to ethnic groups –
including assistance in naturalizing – is likely to increase naturalization among those with low
socioeconomic status compared to the US, which lacks such policies (Bloemraad, 2006a).
Immigrants also confront contexts of reception conditioned by prevailing frameworks of dealing
with difference. For instance, Hispanic immigrants face a hostile context of reception in the US,
which may make it less likely that they seek citizenship or are able to overcome the hurdles in
acquiring it (Portes and Rumbaut, 1996). Empirical research shows that Canada and the US are
comparable in their attitudes toward racial minorities, although social and economic distance
between groups is lower in Canada (Reitz and Breton, 1994). In addition, there are sub-national
differences in the context of reception. For instance, there is local level variation in antiimmigrant sentiment and political mobilization of immigrant groups. In Canada, the province of
Quebec has its own point system for selecting independent immigrants, although the federal
government continues to regulate family migrants and refugees (Grenier, 2003; Labelle and
Salee, 2001). With more emphasis on assimilationist policies than the rest of Canada, we might
expect residence in Quebec to be negatively associated with having citizenship status. The
difference in the institutional contexts of Quebec and the rest of Canada are likely to be much
greater than the differences between American states.
Citizenship acquisition can also be viewed as a by-product of the assimilation process.
With successful adaptation comes commitment to the host country and a change in the identity of
the individual, which are then formalized through naturalization (Gordon, 1964). The
assimilation model is quite complementary to the economic model of naturalization since it also
predicts that immigrants with higher levels of education and income will be more likely to
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naturalize – because they are better integrated into society. Moreover, simply the length of time
spent in the host country will play a decisive role in whether an immigrant has naturalized,
serving as a proxy for increased adaptation to and understanding of the host society.

Data and Methods
This paper uses four waves of census data for each country: 1971, 1981, 1991, and 2001
for Canada and 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 for the US (Ruggles et al, 2004; Statistics Canada,
1971; 1982; 1994; 2005a). I use the 1% Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the US
Census for all waves, 1% PUMS Files from the 1971 Canadian Census, 2% from the 1981
Canadian Census, and 3% from the 1991 and 2000 Canadian Census. The sample in this study
includes foreign-born aged 25 and over at the time of the census. I merge the waves of each
dataset to create two combined datasets. Since naturalization decisions are likely to differ for
immigrants who arrive as children or those who acquire college education in the host country,
analysis is limited to foreign-born individuals who immigrated at age 18 and over. Neither
dataset includes information about the timing of naturalization, making it impossible to establish
causal relationships between determinants and citizenship status. To reduce the possibility of
reverse causality, I restrict analysis to respondents who immigrated between 5 and 15 years
before the census. The American census includes foreign-born individuals who are not eligible
to be naturalized because they are not permanent residents but are either resident foreigners or
undocumented migrants. The 1971 and 1981 waves of the Canadian data are similar to the
American census in this limitation.
The dichotomous dependent variable indicates whether the foreign-born respondent was a
naturalized citizen at the time of the census. The primary determinant of interest is level of
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education, and I also control for income, age at the time of the census, time since migration, sex,
and marital status. Income is measured as the natural log of the total personal income in the year
prior to the census year, adjusted and converted to the value of the US dollar in 1999 using
Purchasing Power Parities and Consumer Price Index (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2006; US
Department of Labor, 2009). For US models, I include dummy variables for states and major
metropolitan areas. For Canada, I control for residence in Quebec. Logistic regression is used to
test the association between level of education and the odds of citizenship, including interaction
effects between year of the census and education.

Results
Table 1 presents proportion naturalized in each educational category by census year.
Overall, the distribution of citizenship varies far more by level of education in the US than in
Canada. The gap in citizenship between levels of education has increased in the US while
remaining small in Canada. For instance, 42% of immigrants with less than high school
education and 45% of those with college education were citizens in the US in 1970. By 2000,
this gap of 3% has increased to 20%, with only 18% of the least educated holding citizenship
status.
Table 2 presents results of logistic regressions predicting citizenship status of immigrants
in Canada and the US. The associations with the level of education, as well as the interaction of
education with the year of the census, reach statistical significance in many cases, particularly in
the US. In addition, income is positively related to citizenship status, with each additional
percent of total yearly income associated with 2.7% higher odds of citizenship in Canada and 1.4
% higher odds of citizenship in the US.1 Other controls are statistically significant as well,
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including age (positive in Canada), time since migration (positive in both), being male (positive
in Canada, negative in the US), and being married (positive in the US). Living in Quebec is
associated with a 35% increase in the odds of citizenship holding other factors constant. In the
US, most state and municipality coefficients do not reach statistical significance (not shown,
available upon request).
In order to interpret the relationship between level of education and citizenship status
over time, it is best to refer to Table 3, which shows predicted probabilities. The predicted
probability of being a citizen in the United States was around 45% for all educational groups in
1970. Controlling for other factors, immigrants grew progressively less likely to be citizens over
time across educational categories. However, those with less than high school education fell
farther behind everyone else. By 2000, the predicted probability of having citizenship for that
group was only 18%, compared to 32% among high school graduates, and 40 and 39% for those
with some college and college educations. Canadian data reveals an almost flat educational
profile of citizenship in 1971, at around 43%, controlling for other factors. By 2001, predicted
probabilities of citizenship are much higher but are still within a narrow range of 76 to 83%. The
increase in probability of citizenship in Canada did not come at the cost of higher inequality by
education level.2
[Tables 1, 2, 3 about here]
Figure 2 shows the odds of having citizenship status by country or region of origin.3
Compared to immigrants from Germany, immigrants to Canada from the US have significantly
lower odds of being citizens. The highest relative odds of having citizenship in Canada are
found among immigrants from USSR and Africa, followed by those from Poland and Asia.
Immigrants from United Kingdom and Italy are not statistically different than immigrants from
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Germany. The US Census allows for a more detailed disaggregation by country or region of
origin. In the US, only Canadian and Northern European immigrants have lower odds of
naturalization than Mexicans, the largest immigrant group. The Japanese and Central Americans
are not significantly different than immigrants from Mexico. The highest odds of naturalization
are to be found among the Vietnamese, immigrants from the USSR, the Philippines, and the
Middle East. The group with the next highest odds includes immigrants from Eastern Europe,
China, and Korea. Only somewhat different from Mexican immigrants in the US are immigrants
from Oceania, Western Europe, South America, Central Europe, and Cuba.
[Figure 2 about here]
As mentioned, a shortcoming of the US Census data is the inability to identify and
exclude undocumented immigrants (who are not eligible for citizenship) from analysis. Thus, it
is possible that the increasingly negative association between less than high school education and
odds of being an American citizen observed here is due to the presence of this disproportionately
unskilled population. It is estimated that over half of undocumented migrants in the US come
from Mexico (Passel, 2005). Therefore, I excluded immigrants born in Mexico, as well as those
born in Central America (altogether eliminating approximately 85% of the undocumented) to
explore the possibility that my results are affected by the presence of those ineligible for
citizenship (see Tables 2 and 3). One notable difference is that the predicted probability of being
a citizen is higher for every level of education once Mexican and Central American origin
immigrants are excluded. In addition, the drop in predicted probability among the least educated
from 20 to 18% between 1990 and 2000 is actually an increase from 23 to 31% once the most
likely to be undocumented are excluded. This indicates that the undocumented could very well
have been depressing the odds of citizenship for the unskilled in this time period. Yet the
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dramatic declines in proportion naturalized – as well as the predicted probabilities of citizenship
controlling for other factors – occurred between 1970 and 1990, and not when the undocumented
population mushroomed in the 1990s (Passel, 2005). Therefore, the inclusion of the
undocumented in the US Census cannot be the entire explanation for the dramatically declining
odds of citizenship among American immigrants with the lowest levels of education between
1970 and 1990.

Discussion
Rates of naturalization grew in Canada and declined in the US in the decades leading up
to the millennium. The contribution of this paper is the analysis of inequalities hidden in these
trends. In the US, citizenship status and the benefits it conveys came to be more unequally
distributed, with unskilled immigrants faring worse than their skilled contemporaries, and worse
than the unskilled in previous decades. In Canada, on the other hand, the significance of
education for citizenship acquisition remained low. Some of the growth in citizenship inequality
in the US is due to the growing undocumented population, which is disproportionately unskilled
and ineligible for citizenship. Nevertheless, the growing inequalities and declines in
naturalization rates became apparent long before the massive growth in undocumented migration
to the US. Traditional economic maximization and assimilation theories would point to an
explanation that hinges on the costs and benefits of acquiring citizenship. What happened in the
1970s and 1980s to raise the costs of naturalization and lower its benefits for immigrants,
particularly unskilled immigrants? In fact, benefits of citizenship for immigrants remained the
same until 1996: voting, improved ability to sponsor family migration, eased travel, and access
to some jobs. The costs, on the other hand, may have increased as the vast immigration
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bureaucracy confronted a dramatic upswing of immigrants without amending naturalization
procedures to improve on the typical “Long Gray Welcome” (North 1987). It is this alienating
and labyrinthine process, with backlogs lengthening in response to the growing numbers of
immigrants, which may have been responsible for the lower uptake of citizenship, particularly
among the unskilled, for whom these hurdles were higher. This, of course, is part of the
American context of reception, described and contrasted to the Canadian alternative by
Bloemraad (2002, 2006a, 2006b). After the reforms of 1996, the benefits of US naturalization
increased dramatically, not only because of access to welfare benefits, but as an opportunity to
escape the sudden precariousness of the permanent resident status. Combined with changes in
many sending countries’ citizenship laws, this led to what appears to be a reversal of a twenty
year downward trend, although not a reversal of the growing inequality in citizenship.
Meanwhile, the low significance of education for naturalization in Canada is consistent with the
expansion and consolidation of multiculturalism policies in the 1970s and the lowering of
barriers to citizenship in the Citizenship Act of 1977 (Kaplan, 1991). Given Canada’s proactive
approach to naturalization of immigrants – outreach and funding of various programs – it is not
surprising that immigrants with the lowest levels of education are not as disadvantaged as they
are in the US.
Another factor of importance in this analysis appears to be the context of exit. In both
countries, the more “reversible” the migration is, the less likely are migrants to become citizens:
migrants from repressive political regimes and/or migrants from far away have the highest odds
of acquiring citizenship, while those from neighboring countries and countries with democratic
regimes have the lowest odds, controlling for other factors. In the US, these patterns of
naturalization intersect with patterns of racial stratification. Immigrants from Mexico and
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Central and Southern America have some of the lowest odds of citizenship. They are closely
followed by black immigrants from the West Indies and Africa. The low odds of having
citizenship for Hispanic and black immigrants exacerbates the disadvantages experienced by
Hispanic and black populations in the US in general. The Asian label obscures variability:
immigrants from some parts of Asia have much lower odds of naturalization than others,
controlling for other factors. Race does not have the same significance in Canada as it does in
the US (Reitz and Breton 1994). There are relatively few Hispanic immigrants in Canada but
other ‘visible minorities’, including black and Asian immigrants, have relatively high odds of
citizenship. In fact, the lowest odds are to be found among white groups. Refugees in the US
receive additional government assistance in acquiring citizenship, so the association between
country of origin and odds of citizenship could reflect that factor as well. Cuba is an exception:
one would expect high odds of citizenship because of the refugee status of the immigrants and
the difficulty in returning, but being from Cuba is associated with relatively low odds of
citizenship.
Place of residence once in the host country matters as well. Since Quebec stresses
assimilation to the Francophone culture (Grenier, 2003; Labelle and Salee, 2001), we might
expect residence there to negatively impact the odds of naturalization compared to the rest of
Canada, where multiculturalism policies facilitate feelings of trust and loyalty to the government.
However, living in Quebec is associated with significantly higher odds of citizenship than living
in other Canadian provinces, even when origin countries are held constant. In fact, previous
studies have found that immigrants in Quebec are more likely than immigrants to other provinces
to speak neither English nor French, and to subsequently transition to using English (Beaujot,
2003). In addition, although Quebec has some freedom in deciding which immigrants to admit,
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naturalization is still managed from Ottawa and is clearly about joining Canada. Perhaps,
immigrants in Quebec have higher odds of citizenship because they are resisting Quebec’s
efforts at assimilation – or reacting to the difficulty of integrating into the Quebecois identity
group – by becoming Canadian, not Quebecois. Further research is needed to investigate this
counterintuitive finding. In the US, there were a few statistically significant effects of living in
different states (available upon request), although it is difficult to discern any coherent patterns.
This analysis is focused on citizenship status among recent adult immigrants, not the
entire immigrant populations of Canada and the US. Other types of immigrants, such as
longtime residents and immigrants who arrived as children, are likely to have higher incidence of
naturalization. For the population examined, however, there is not simply a growing national
gap in naturalization rates between Canada and the US, but a hidden growing inequality in how
citizenship is distributed in the US.

Conclusion
Trends in citizenship acquisition by immigrants flag failures and successes of immigrant
incorporation in multicultural democracies. But gross trends can hide additional patterns of
inequality that map onto existing systems of stratification. The differences in citizenship status
by level of education among Canadian immigrants are small, dwarfed by the sheer size of the
increase in naturalization rates for everyone in the last thirty years. Even the least educated
immigrants in Canada are naturalizing at almost twice the rate of the most educated immigrants
in the US. The situation in the US, on the other hand, is a cause for concern. Persistent and
large inequalities in citizenship leave the already disadvantaged unskilled immigrants without the
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access to rights, representation, security, and job and educational opportunities that citizenship
brings.
The US Citizenship and Immigration Service (the government agency responsible for
immigrant naturalization) has been working on directly promoting citizenship acquisition, which
may increase the rates of citizenship among the most disadvantaged. Despite some post-9/11
delays in application processing, the number of newly naturalized immigrants is high in the
2000s (USDHS, 2009). The same period, however, saw the development of a new and far more
rigorous naturalization test. Aside from raising the citizenship hurdle for the unskilled, this test
is indicative of the ongoing anxiety about the ‘cheapening’ of citizenship in the US (Preston,
2007). In addition, by 2008, naturalization fees increased from a few hundred dollars to $675
(compared to only $200 in Canada). Thus, it seems unlikely that current American naturalization
policies can adequately reverse the dismal rates of naturalization and the inequality hidden
within these rates.
High naturalization rates alone are not a guarantee of successful immigrant integration.
There are many forms of exclusion that continue to affect immigrants regardless of citizenship
status. Nevertheless, citizenship at least holds the potential of inclusion. With that in mind,
Canada is more successful at immigrant incorporation. The US could probably raise
naturalization rates, especially among the disadvantaged segments of immigrant population, by
replicating some of the Canadian programs that promote citizenship and assist in the
naturalization process through English and civic classes. Concern over the consequences of
extremely low rates of naturalization and the compounded disadvantage of the least educated
should outweigh anxiety over maintaining high boundaries around citizenship.
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1. Inclusion of an instrumental variable measuring expected gain in income from acquiring
citizenship did not significantly alter the results of these models. The variable itself was
statistically significant but had the value of 1.000 (odds ratio).
2. I also ran separate models for each educational group. These results are in line with those
reported for the entire immigrant population, with two exceptions. In Canada, living in Quebec
is only positively associated with citizenship for those with less than college education. In the
United States, time since migration has a significant and positive coefficient only for those with
college education.
3. No measure of dual citizenship was included in the analysis. Controls for country or region of
origin were used instead. Many of the sending countries that adopted dual citizenship provisions
did so at the very end of the period under consideration, and this should not change the trends
observed between 1970 and 1991.
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Table 1.

Percent Naturalized by Level of Education and Year of Census
Less than
H.S.
Some
College and
h.s.

college

Total

above

US

CA

US

CA

US

CA

US

CA

US

CA

All

23.8

60.6

34.3

63.2

39.8

71.6

40.7

74.7

32.4

67.0

1970/1

41.6

42.6

45.3

41.8

45.5

42.6

44.7

42.0

43.4

42.3

1980/1

27.2

52.3

37.6

60.4

38.8

60.2

44.7

66.4

34.5

58.5

1990/1

20.3

70.9

32.3

71.2

38.9

74.9

40.8

76.9

30.9

73.5

2000/1

18.2

76.5

31.6

77.8

39.8

78.4

38.6

82.5

30.0

78.9

Source: Canadian Census 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001 and US Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000.
Note: The sample is limited to immigrants who are aged at least 25 and arrived in Canada or the US
between 5 and 15 years prior to the census at age 18 or higher.

Table 2.

Selected Odds Ratios from Logistic Regressions Predicting Citizenship Status
of Immigrants in Canada and the US.
United States without
Mexico & Central
Canada

United States

America

Age

1.005***

0.999

0.998***

Years since migration

1.173**

1.217***

1.237***

Male

1.066**

0.929***

0.928***

Married

0.955

1.189***

1.193***

Less than high school

0.951

0.793***

0.772***

Some college

0.974

0.986

0.977

College

0.908

0.824**

0.812**

Highest level of education (ref: high school)

23

Logged income

1.027***

1.014***

1.015***

1980/1

2.237***

0.599***

0.577***

1990/1

2.360***

0.447***

0.421***

2000/1

3.219*

0.446***

0.463***

Quebec

1.349***

Census year (ref: 1970/1)

Interaction effects: edu*year
Less than hs * 1980/1

0.653***

0.855**

0.864*

Less than hs * 1990/1

0.924

0.811***

0.656***

Less than hs * 2000/1

0.923

0.729***

0.840**

Some college * 1980/1

1.027

1.057

1.073

Some college * 1990/1

1.384**

1.260**

1.343***

Some college * 2000/1

1.163

1.288***

1.276**

College * 1980/1

1.458**

1.302***

1.320***

College * 1990/1

1.705***

1.427***

1.490***

College * 2000/1

1.673***

1.268***

1.194*

57,521

138,554

98,372

N

Source: Canadian Census 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001 and US Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000.
Note: The sample is limited to immigrants who are aged at least 25 and arrived in Canada or the US
between 5 and 15 years prior to the census at age 18 or higher. The models also include controls for
country/region of origin and states and selected metropolitan areas in the US.
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 *** p<0.001

24

Table 3.

Predicted Probabilities of Citizenship Status by Level of Education and Year
US - Without Mexicans and
US - All

Census
Year

Less

Canada-All

Some

Less

Central Americans

Some

Less

Some

than hs

HS

college

College

than hs

HS

college

College

than hs

HS

college

College

1970/1

0.42

0.45

0.45

0.45

0.43

0.40

0.43

0.43

0.45

0.46

0.45

0.45

1980/1

0.27

0.38

0.39

0.45

0.52

0.60

0.60

0.67

0.32

0.39

0.40

0.45

1990/1

0.20

0.32

0.39

0.41

0.71

0.72

0.72

0.77

0.23

0.35

0.42

0.42

2000/1

0.18

0.32

0.40

0.39

0.76

0.78

0.78

0.83

0.31

0.38

0.44

0.40
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Figure 1.

Percentage of Citizens Among All Foreign-Born Residents in the
United States and Canada 1970-2006.

Percent naturalized

100%
80%
60%

US
Canada

40%
20%
0%
1970/1

1980/1

1990/1

2000/1

2006

Source: Canadian Census 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2006, US Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000,
American Communities Survey 2006.
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Figure 2.

Odds Ratios for Country/Region of Origin in Multiple Regressions
Predicting Citizenship Status in Canada and the US.
Vietnam
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Africa
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Southwest Asia
West Indies
Southeast Asia
Other Asia
Cuba
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South America
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Asia
Americas
Other Europe
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Germany
Other
United Kingdom
USA
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3
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6
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Odds of Citizenship

Source: Canadian Census 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, US Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000
White bar indicates statistically non-significant at the p<0.05 level. Black bar is the omitted category.
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